

日本インテリジェンス体制：  
変革へのロードマップ

# JAPAN

**Japanese Intelligence System:  
A Roadmap to Transformation**

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**Japanese Intelligence System:**  
A Roadmap to Transformation

Translated by  
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Originally published (June 2006) by  
PHP Research Centre, Tokyo

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## Translator's Introduction

'Japanese Intelligence System – A Roadmap to Transformation' sets out a detailed analysis of the shortcomings evidenced in the present Japanese intelligence system, and a detailed blueprint – 'Roadmap' – that will allow Japan to develop a self-sufficient intelligence system that can provide its political decision-makers with the range and quality of information and analysis to enable them to make effective decisions based on an accurate understanding of the environment that they are operating in.

PHP ([www.research.php.co.jp](http://www.research.php.co.jp)) is a leading Japanese think-tank specialising in public and social policy. This paper, published in June 2006, is the result of a series of round-table discussions and public hearings. The authors of this paper are international authorities in their own individual fields, and there is no question that this paper is recognised as making a significant contribution to the on-going debate about the role of the future Japanese intelligence system, and the procedures and processes that will be required in order to realise those visions.

This translation covers the first half of the PHP publication, which focuses on identifying and analysing structural shortcomings in the present Japanese intelligence structure. (The second half, which will be available shortly, gives a breakdown of the history and roles of the various individual intelligence agencies).

This is a first draft, which has been processed in such a way as to allow non-Japanese speakers (and readers) who have an interest in this subject to gain access to a paper that is at the heart of the discussion concerning the future role of Japanese intelligence agencies, both inside and outside of Japan.

As a non-expert in governmental and intelligence organisational structures, it is likely that the use of bureau, division, office, etc may not be an accurate reflection of their English equivalences, but it is hoped that their meaning will be clear in the context within which they are used.


I welcome any feedback as to the contents and technical translation aspect of this paper, and offer it in the hope that it will make a contribution to the on-going strengthening of UK-Japan relationships.

**David Rubens**

April 2009

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# Japanese Intelligence System – A Roadmap to Transformation



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## Foreword

### Why do we need reforms in the intelligence system now?

Before the Second World War, in a mis-reading of the dramatic changes that were taking place in the international situation, this country formed an alliance with Germany and Italy, and went to war on the United States. In the present time, the international security environment that this country is involved in is undergoing similar dramatic changes. In order not to repeat the same mistakes of that pre-War period, it is vital that our political leaders understand the importance of restructuring and strengthening our intelligence system.

The four 'shifts in tectonic plates' listed below, both inside and outside the system, need to be prioritised in order to develop the changes needed in this country's intelligence system.

Firstly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of non-national terror and organised crime organisations, has meant that there is growing concern about these diffused and multi-faceted dangers. As a result, the area that requires security cover, both from a geographical perspective and numerically, has risen by several levels.

Consequently, the necessity for international cooperation in the security arena has also grown. In particular, there has been a growing call for cooperation with our American alliance partner in reference to international terror policy and missile defence.

As Richard Armitage, the former US Deputy Secretary of State, and others have pointed out, the weaknesses in this country's security system, and particularly structural weaknesses in the security systems, have contributed to a lack of progress in intelligence cooperation with the US.

On the other hand, in order to ensure our own national sovereignty, there is a growing need to develop an independent intelligence capability. Since the terror attacks of 9/11, there is the growing awareness that policy decision-makers are dependent on high-level intelligence in order to be able to satisfy the requirement for an approach that can eradicate the roots of such problems before they mature into a serious threats.

For example, in relation to Iran's intentions concerning the development of nuclear capability, without an independent intelligence capability it is impossible for our country to have an independent sovereign judgement over the likelihood of whether US will take defensive action or not.

Secondly, there is a dynamic change in the balance of power in south-east Asia. In particular, both for ourselves and for other countries it is necessary to monitor the direction that China's growing expansion is taking. With America's presence in Iraq, it is possible that its' relationship with other regions will also undergo radical change. It is necessary to have background intelligence in order to make medium- and long-term judgements concerning the responses that are available in order to influence the regional order to develop in desired ways.....

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## Japan's Intelligence System

### Roadmap to Transformation

It is unlikely that there is anyone who would, in considering Japan's intelligence system, state that 'It is sufficient'. The fact is that in recent years many voices have been raised calling for the strengthening of our country's intelligence system. Moreover, a number of proposals have been released. Despite this, none of these proposals have been implemented. One reason for this is the required decision-making demands leadership from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and in addition, such a move would require a package-deal including large-scale organisational reforms as well as legislation and budgetary input, so it becomes stagnated before it reaches activation levels. As a result of this, there is the attitude that even if there is a danger, it is acceptable to wait before making any response, as in 'In this country as well, we will make the reforms once something has happened'. Basically, the first responsibility of intelligence is to give early warning of danger, fixing the things that need to be fixed, and thereby acting as a prevention in order that the danger should not occur.

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### **Discussion Points concerning the structural problems as a whole**

**The information-gathering and assessing system available to the Cabinet Office is weak. As long as the Cabinet Joint Intelligence Committee is insufficiently effective, we will remain without a viable 'Intelligence Community'.**

**As long as there is a rigid compartmentalisation both between government ministries and agencies and between different departments within those ministries and agencies, the problem of intelligence-sharing will remain unresolved.**

**The current situation is that the intelligence security structure and counter-intelligence structure are inadequate as a pre-condition for the promotion of intelligence-sharing, which would in turn lead to the activation of high-quality intelligence activity.**



